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X.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide some insight into how cognitive work is 
conceptualized and investigated in the tradition of cognitive systems engineering 
(CSE) advocated by David Woods and his colleagues, including in particular Erik 
Hollnagel and Emilie Roth. First I survey recent treatments of cognitive work analysis 
(CWA) and cognitive task analysis (CTA). Then I introduce the idea of joint cognitive 
systems and the cognitive systems triad—these are concepts that have been 
fundamental in Woods’ work for decades. Following that I describe a model for human 
performance analysis that for some time has guided investigations into how people 
cope with complexity and has lain at the heart of the way Woods and his colleagues 
approach analysis and design of cognitive work. I then describe an investigative 
context dubbed “staged worlds” that Woods and colleagues use to preserve authenticity 
while enhancing the efficiency of investigations and I illustrate the use of staged 
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worlds with a recently published emergency medical response example (Smith, 
Bentley, Fernandez, Gibson, Schweikhart, & Woods, 2013). Finally, the model of 
human performance analysis and the above methods lead to “laws” that describe joint 
cognitive systems at work. 
 
X.2  Analysing Cognitive Work Through CWA and CTA 
Many approaches have emerged in CSE and cognate fields of inquiry for investigating 
cognitive work. Two widely-used approaches are cognitive task analysis (CTA) and 
cognitive work analysis (CWA). Given the many excellent recent reviews of CTA and 
CWA there is little need for a further detailed review of their principles and methods. 
However it is worth pointing to the origins of the approaches and to the recent 
treatments of them.  
 
The principles that underlie both approaches to understanding cognitive work reach 
back over 30 years, to the genesis of cognitive systems engineering (Hollnagel & 
Woods, 1983) and to European studies of human-machine systems conducted in the 
decade before the Three-Mile Island accident in 1979 (see treatments in Sheridan & 
Johannsen, 1976; Rasmussen & Rouse, 1981 as well as overviews in Flach, 2016; Le 
Coze, 2015, 2016, and others). Since the early 1980s, Woods has been a core 
contributor and leader in the development and expression of those principles, and in 
the development and expression of methods for understanding cognitive work.  
 
Within CSE, CTA and CWA are often compared and contrasted, given that they are 
core methods for analyzing cognitive work. CSE has been defined as the analysis, 
modeling, design and evaluation of complex sociotechnical systems so that workers 
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can do their work and carry out tasks more safely, and with greater efficiency. In the 
context of CSE, the term “cognitive work” is usually used to represent the individual 
and collective sense-making activities of workers and other agents in complex 
sociotechnical systems. The phrase “analysis of cognitive work” usually covers 
activities that CSE researchers carry out when performing CWA or CTA. The main 
focus of this chapter is Woods’ contributions not only to the analysis of cognitive work 
but also to the design of cognitive work. As will be seen, Woods and colleagues refer 
to their analytic activities as CTA, and their design activities are guided by laws that 
govern cognitive work, including laws that govern joint cognitive systems at work. 
 
The term CWA is by convention reserved for the systematic approach to analyzing the 
constraints operating on cognitive work that emerged from the work of Rasmussen and 
his colleagues at Riso National Laboratories in Denmark (Rasmussen 1986; 
Rasmussen, Pejtersen, & Goodsein, 1994; Vicente, 1999; LeCoze 2015; 2016). CWA 
focuses on analyzing the constraints that shape cognitive work, using a family of 
analytic templates that guide the identification of those constraints and their 
interactions. The term CTA is best reserved for approaches to analyzing cognitive 
work other than CWA, but those approaches may nonetheless share some of the 
theoretical commitments of CWA because they emerge from the same history. A 
similar distinction between CWA and CTA is respected in Lee and Kirlik’s (2013) 
handbook of cognitive engineering, with its separate chapters on CWA (Roth & 
Bisantz, 2013) and CTA (Crandall & Hoffman, 2013). Again, however, the fact that a 
distinction can be made should not obscure similarities between the two approaches to 
the analysis of cognitive work and the intertwined history of their development. 
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As noted, CTA and CWA have been the subject of many recent authoritative reviews, 
making a repetition of their fundamentals unnecessary. CWA has received several 
thorough treatments over the 30 years or so of its existence. The foundational work of 
Rasmussen is available through the Rasmussen (1986) and Rasmussen, Pejtersen, and 
Goodstein (1994) monographs. The work received a subsequent pedagogical 
interpretation in Vicente (1999) and many aspects of Rasmussen’s way of analyzing 
cognitive work have been the subject of a recent special issue of Applied Ergonomics. 
Further monographs and edited books on CWA include Bisantz and Burns (2009), 
Jenkins, Stanton, Salmon, and Walker (2009), Lintern (2013) and Naikar (2013). 
Review chapters focusing on CWA include Sanderson (2003) and Roth and Bisantz 
(2013). Many recent treatments of CWA offer novel templates intended to help 
analysts apply the principles of CWA more effectively at each phase, or to link 
analyses more effectively with analyses at other phases (Naikar, 2013; Cornelissen et 
al., 2012; Hassall & Sanderson, 2013; Ashoori & Burns, 2010). 
 
Since 2000, CTA has also been thoroughly reviewed in monographs or edited books 
such as those by by Schraagen, Chipman and Shalin (2000), Crandall, Klein, and 
Hoffmann (2006), and in Hoffman and Militello’s excellent monograph on CTA 
methods (2008). Recent reviews of CTA also include Crandall and Hoffman (2013). 
Treatments of CTA often describe different methods of eliciting information about 
cognitive work. The most helpful treatments also describe the process of understanding 
the phenomenology of work in a lawful way. For example, as we will see, Woods has 
proposed laws that express important generalities about how people and technology 
interact (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006). Those laws have been inferred from investigating 
and analyzing the successes and failures of human-system integration in many 
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domains—in other words, from different CTAs conducted in widely differing 
industries.  
 
Reviews that cover both CTA and CWA include Bisantz and Roth (2008) and Hoffman 
and Militello (2009). CTA and CWA were also covered in a major review of 
methodological challenges for a science of sociotechnical systems and safety 
(Waterson, Robertson, Cooke, Militello, Roth, & Stanton, 2015).  
 
X.3  Joint Cognitive Systems and the Cognitive Systems Triad 
From the CSE perspective, the entity performing cognitive work—and therefore the 
entity to be investigated—is not just the individual human actor. Since their 
formulation of CSE, Woods and colleagues have brought a “joint cognitive systems” 
perspective to the development of useful theoretical frameworks for understanding 
cognitive work (Hollnagel & Woods, 1983; Woods, 1985). Hollnagel and Woods 
(2005) define a cognitive system as “a simple system capable of anti-entropic 
behavior” (p. 78) which could be a human or an intelligent device of some kind. They 
then define a joint cognitive system as a combination of a cognitive system plus (a) one 
or more further cognitive systems and/or (b) one or more objects (physical artefacts) or 
rules (social artefacts) that is used in the joint cognitive system’s work. Clearly, there 
are many forms that a joint cognitive system can take that extend far beyond the 
individual.   
 
A key feature of Woods’ approach to the analysis of cognitive work has been the so-
called cognitive systems triad (Woods, 1988; Woods & Roth, 1988) which reflects the 
fact that a joint cognitive system carries out its functions in a context or environment. 
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The cognitive systems triad shows the interplay of agents (people, cognitive systems, 
joint cognitive systems), artifacts (technology, representations), and the external world 
(demands, constraints, dynamics). An early version of the cognitive systems triad 
(Woods, 1988) is shown at left of Figure 1, and a later version, annotated with relevant 
elements (Woods, Tinapple, Roesler, & Feil, 2002) is shown at right of Figure 1. 
 
______________________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
_______________________________________ 
 
As Woods notes, the cognitive systems triad is not analytically decomposable because 
when cognitive work takes place in complex sociotechnical systems, its three elements 
are inextricably linked to each other. In other words, one cannot understand cognitive 
work by examining each of the three elements independently of the other—by studying 
agents alone, artifacts alone, or the external world alone—and then trying to combine 
them. This fact imposes constraints on how CTA should be performed: the connections 
between agents, artifacts and the external world cannot be ruptured. Accordingly, data 
supporting a CTA must come from qualified agents addressing authentic demands 
from their domain of work, using representative work artifacts and tools, as we will see 
in the Smith et al. (2013) example presented later in this chapter.  
 
X.4  Theory-Driven Analysis and Design 
Many treatments of CTA and CWA emphasise the process rather than the purpose of 
performing analyses of cognitive work. A model that has appeared in different forms 
for over 35 years, and that reappears in the writings of Woods and colleagues, provides 
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one way of thinking about the purpose of CTA. The model is most succinctly described 
diagrammatically, and an example is shown in Figure 2. The diagram distinguishes 
data-driven and concept-driven forms of analysis, and helps us focus on why analyses 
of cognitive work are done, as much as on how analyses are done. 
 
The history of the diagram points to the intentions behind it. Early research at Riso 
National Laboratories about how best to support the cognitive work of nuclear power 
plant (NPP) operators produced powerful ways of analyzing records of cognitive work, 
some of which are summarized in a Riso technical report by Hollnagel, Pedersen and 
Rasmussen (1981). The approach is also described briefly for the US audience in one 
of Woods’ and Hollnagel’s earliest joint papers (Woods & Hollnagel, 1982).  
 
During their analysis of incidents, events, and accidents in nuclear power plants, 
Hollnagel et al. were confronted with many different sources of human performance 
data: event reports, post-incident reviews and interviews, recordings of performance in 
training simulators specific to a particular plant, and recordings of performance in 
more generalized research simulators. The challenge was to find a “common analytical 
framework” that would help researchers arrive at a conceptually coherent account of 
operator cognitive work, capable of both providing insight into the particular events 
examined and providing theoretical constructs that could be generalized and tested in 
other contexts. The analyses were being performed in the aftermath of the Three-Mile 
Island accident in 1979, and the framework was intended to be a practical tool for 
engineers rather than a formal model for academics (Erik Hollnagel, personal 
communication, 24 January 2016). 
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Hollnagel et al. (1981) describe their process of converting raw data into forms that are 
useful for various purposes—initially, for deciding on training programs for NPP 
operators. The inputs and outputs of the process are shown in Figure 2, which is a 
reworking for present purposes of earlier versions of the diagram that appear in 
Hollnagel et al. (1981), Hollnagel (1986), Xiao and Vicente (2000), Woods and 
Hollnagel (2006), Hollnagel (2015) and other locations. The reworking in Figure 2 
rearranges the analysis and prediction columns for better flow, rewords some elements 
for better understanding and, incidentally, corrects a small error that crept into prior 
reproductions, for example in Woods and Hollnagel (2006). 
 
X.4.1 Left side of human performance analysis diagram 
 
The boxes in the CTA (left) column of the diagram show that analysts build formal, 
context-free accounts of cognitive work through a series of steps that combine data and 
impose theoretical interpretations until, at the top, a context-free theoretical description 
is reached that can in principle be applied to other contexts. We can view this as a 
process of abstraction from a context-specific account to a context-independent 
account (Xiao & Vicente, 2000).  
 
___________________________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
First, at the start of the process, which is seen at the bottom of the diagram, event 
reports, reviews, interviews, observations, and simulator-based human performance 
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data are the raw event data. Second, once the raw event data are aggregated and 
rearranged into a whole, for example by being placed on a timeline, and different 
forms of data are integrated (for example, performance logs and verbalization are 
aligned) they become integrated event data providing a coherent account of an 
individual’s work processes, in professional or domain terms, but without 
interpretation. Third, the records of actual performance are then redescribed in a more 
formal language to become analysed event data, where the elements of actual 
performance are classified into categories that may emerge from pre-existing theories, 
ontologies or templates relating to cognitive work, such as general information-
gathering strategies or as problem solving steps the operator uses to handle specific 
problems in the domain. The analysed event data start to offer an interpretation of why 
the data are as they are. 
 
Fourth, from here, data from multiple individual cases of performance are aggregated 
to arrive at conceptual descriptions for the specific context under examination. 
Recurring categories are noted, and the patterns of similarities and differences across 
the multiple cases are noted, still using the formal language introduced for analysed 
event data, along with factors that might account for the similarities and differences. 
Fifth, what Hollnagel et al. (1981) called a competence description removes reference 
to the specific context or contexts in which the raw data were collected. It provides a 
description of the “behavioural repertoire” of the operator for the general class of 
situations examined, and not for any particular situation or even for any particular 
domain. The conceptual description is placed within a broader theoretical framework 
that can be generalized to other contexts.  
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X.4.2 Right side of human performance analysis diagram 
 
The boxes in the CTD (right) side of Figure 2 handle performance prediction; they 
show how an evaluation can be performed of factors likely to change cognitive work, 
such as new work tools or new work processes. As Hollnagel et al. (1981) stated, “the 
competence description is … essentially the basis for performance prediction during 
system design” (p. 12). We can consider the process of moving from the competence 
description to raw data as a process of instantiation (Xiao & Vicente, 2000). However, 
the theme of instantiation is not pursued further in the 1981 paper. The theme of 
instantiation reappears in Hollnagel’s (1985) discussion of cognitive performance 
analysis, where a more explicit discussion of a top down process of instantiation is 
offered. The Hollnagel (1985) diagram also specifies a top-down process of prediction, 
as do the more fully worked diagrams in Woods and Hollnagel (2006) and Woods 
(2003) – and the version in Figure 2.  
 
In the CTD (right) or prediction side of Figure 2, the analyst starts with theories of 
competence, and can conjecture what the required competence will be for the desired 
cognitive work within the system. The means of support for that competence then 
needs to be engineered or implemented, and tested. Design specifications can be 
identified that produce an account of the desired prototypical performance, the 
presence of which can be tested by trying out the design with one or more workers in 
authentic professional contexts to produce instantiations of the prototypical 
performance, or formal performance. Formal performance is inferred from 
performance fragments combined into accounts of actual performance and interpreted 
in the appropriate theoretical frame.  
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The CTD or prediction side of Figure 2 is where abstract concepts can be put “into 
empirical jeopardy as explanatory or anticipatory tools in specific situations” (Woods 
& Hollnagel, 2006). A fuller description is given in Woods and Hollnagel (2006) that 
includes the potential for interplay between processes on the two sides of the diagram. 
 
The processes [in the diagram] capture the heart of Neisser’s perceptual 
cycle as a model of robust conceptualization and revision … moving up 
abstracts particulars into patterns; moving down puts abstract concepts into 
empirical jeopardy as explanatory or anticipatory tools in specific 
situations. This view of re-conceptualization points out that what is critical 
is not one or the other of these processes; rather, the value comes from 
engaging in both in parallel. When focused on abstract patterns, shift and 
consider how the abstract plays out in varying particular situations; when 
focused on the particular, shift and consider how the particular instantiates 
more abstract patterns ... This is a basic heuristic for functional synthesis, 
and the interplay of moving up and down helps balance the trade-off 
between the risk of being trapped in the details of specific situations, people, 
and events, and the risk of being trapped in dependence on a set of concepts 
which can prove incomplete or wrong. (p. 49) 
 
The above description makes it clear that the cognitive work of the analyst who is 
investigating cognitive work requires tools that support rapid shifts between raw data 
and interpretation, and between different perspectives. Software tools for exploratory 
sequential data analysis (Sanderson & Fisher, 1994) such as MacSHAPA (Sanderson et 
12 
 
al., 1994) were an attempt to provide such support. It is not clear that the current 
generation of software tools presents any great improvement in supporting the 
analyst’s shifts between raw data and theoretical interpretations and between 
perspectives—robust tools for supporting the work of analysts analyzing cognitive 
work have still to be created. 
 
X.4.3 Uses of the human performance analysis diagram 
 
The model of human performance analysis outlined in Hollnagel et al. (1981) was 
quickly absorbed into Woods’ thinking. For Hollnagel, Woods, and their students and 
close colleagues, it has guided methods for performing field investigations ever since. 
For example, Roth, Christian, Gustafson, Sheridan, Dwyer, Gandhi, Zinner and Dierks 
(2004) and Roth and Patterson (2005) show that field investigations guided by the 
model can benefit from existing conceptual frameworks but also provide a means to 
develop new conceptual frameworks and new insights. Saleem, Patterson, Militello, 
Render, Orshansky & Asch (2005) used the model to analyse VA providers’ 
interactions with computerized clinical reminders. As will be seen in the next sections, 
Woods (2003) extended the lessons of the model to ‘staged world’ studies, showing 
how process tracing of performance in such studies can lead to high-level functional 
accounts of competence. Most recently, the model was revisited by Hollnagel (2015) in 
a resilience engineering chapter on finding patterns in everyday healthcare work.  
 
Two widely-cited examples of uses of the Hollnagel et al. (1981) framework are 
provided by Xiao and Vicente (2000) who used variants of the framework to describe 
(1) the process of discovering the nature of anesthesiologists’ peri-operative 
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preparations in Xiao (1994), which reflects a process of abstraction and (2) the 
evaluation of ecological interface design principles for visual display design, which 
reflects a process of instantiation (Vicente, 1991).  
 
In the first case, involving the process of abstraction, Xiao (1994) investigated how 
anesthesiologists prepare their management of a patient, given that each patient is 
different and given that patient monitoring technology provides only partial views of 
the true state of the patient. Xiao aggregated field notes and recordings to arrive at an 
integrated description of individual anesthesiologists’ planning performance. Specific 
preparatory strategies were then noted in the language of the domain itself, such as 
prefilling and systematizing the layout of syringes.  Further abstraction was achieved 
by describing the purpose of the anesthesiologists’ strategies in more general terms, 
such as providing reminders, offloading workload, etc. Finally, a competence 
description was achieved through broad generalisations transcending specific 
situations, individuals, and contexts, such as statements about how expert practitioners 
in complex worlds manage complexity: “Experienced practitioners reduce response 
complexity through anticipating future situations, mental preparation, and reorganizing 
the physical workspace” (Xiao & Vicente, 2000; p. 98). Knowledge of expert 
competencies could, in turn, guide the search for further instances or for 
counterinstances in a dataset, or could guide tests of generalizability to other domains.  
 
In the second case, involving instantiation, Vicente (1991) used a theory of competent 
management of system disturbances to create a visual display design that would 
produce performance data that would confirm or refute the theory, in a process of 
instantiation. Again, “designs are hypotheses about how artifacts shape cognition and 
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collaboration” (Woods, 1988; p. 168). Starting at the top level, and based on principles 
of ecological interface design (Vicente & Rasmussen, 1990; 1992) Vicente’s 
theoretical claims were that (1) operators are better able to handle unanticipated 
variability if they can engage in knowledge-based behavior, and (2) knowledge-based 
behavior is best served by a display that provides a representation of the work domain 
that is based on an abstraction hierarchy. At the second level, two interfaces 
instantiated the theory in a concrete context – control of a thermodynamic process – 
with one interface embodying ecological interface design (EID) principles and the 
other not. At the third level the objective was to construct a task that would provide 
“formal performance data” – aggregated experimental data capable of clearly reflecting 
changes in performance related to the presence or absence of EID principles. At the 
fourth and fifth levels the concern was with identifying and collating the most 
appropriate information from participants to build the formal account.  
 
So, on the one hand, Figure 2 describes a CTA process that helps us abstract lawful 
relationships about the interaction of people and technology. On the other hand, Figure 
2 describes a CTD process of applying and testing those laws through changing one 
aspect of the cognitive systems triad, and for much of Woods’ work that has involved 
changing the artifacts—the technology. Woods’ work on CTA has been tightly linked 
to the extraction of regularities about sociotechnical systems that can be applied to 
different domains, and the generation of designs likely to support successful joint 
cognitive work. Too often, CTA is described in isolation from CTD, but Figure 2 
makes it clear why CTA must be considered hand in hand with CTD. Further 
information about CTD from this perspective is available in Hollnagel (2003) and 
Woods (2003).  
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X.5  Shaping the Conditions of Observation with Staged Worlds 
There are many ways in which analysts can investigate authentic professional work, 
each of which has advantages and disadvantages. In very early work, Woods (1985) 
identified an “observation problem” in psychology and particularly in the study of 
complex cognitive work within joint cognitive systems. Woods (1985) distinguished 
three mutual constraints on the ability to observe cognitive work – (1) specificity, 
which is the degree of control exercised by the observer and the repeatability of the 
analysis, (2) apparent realism or face validity, which is the fidelity of the observed 
work context with respect to the actual work context of interest, and (3) 
meaningfulness, which is the theoretical richness of the resulting account and its ability 
to be applied in other contexts. 
 
One of the most important concerns in understanding cognitive work remains how to 
maximize the leverage gained from interactions with professionals in authentic work 
contexts, particularly with respect to the above meaningfulness dimension. Over the 
last 35 or more years, CSE methods have included naturalistic observation, think aloud 
protocols, structured interview techniques such as the critical decision methodology, 
and behavioural or performance logs of professionals in their work contexts. Amongst 
these methods is Woods’ idea of shaping the conditions of observation through staged 
worlds as a method for studying cognitive work. 
 
X.5.1 Staged worlds 
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Staged worlds are not often discussed in reviews of CWA and CTA although they were 
noted in the reviews by Bisantz and Roth (2008) and Hoffman and Militello (2008). 
Despite this, staged worlds are an important tool in Woods’ approach to understanding 
cognitive work.  
 
In order to illustrate whether the conditions of observation preserve the interlinked 
relationships in the cognitive triad, Woods (1993; 2003; and elsewhere) contrasts 
staged worlds with natural history methods and spartan laboratory experiments. 
Natural history methods are effectively field studies, where the operation of the 
cognitive systems triad is undisturbed. Spartan laboratory experiments, in contrast, 
usually remove most of the properties of the external world and sometimes also of the 
agents and artifacts, in the interest of “control”.  
 
Staged worlds are effectively simulations of work contexts that focus on specific 
situations or problems that practitioners may encounter and that preserve key 
interrelationships in the cognitive systems triad. The effectiveness of a staged world 
rests in how effectively the essential properties of the cognitive systems triad are 
preserved in the experiences created—experiences that emerge from the relationship 
between people, technology, and work. A staged world can create situations that might 
arise only very seldom in naturalistic observation, while still preserving key properties 
of the work domain that create an authentic, immersive experience for practitioners. As 
a result, a staged world is an effective and efficient means of investigating cognitive 
work. A staged world can be used to probe strategies, trace cognitive processes, 
explore the impact of new work systems, and so on. It is therefore a powerful tool for 
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analyzing cognitive work and for understanding how practitioners cope with 
complexity.  
 
The above description of natural history methods, staged worlds, and Spartan 
laboratory experiments might suggest that only three distinct categories of observation 
exist, which is patently not the case. Instead, the three methods exist on a continuum. 
For example, a natural history method may introduce contrasts by sampling situations 
or contexts, or field experiments may be possible by inserting probes or prototypes into 
the full operational work environment. As a further example, a staged world may 
reproduce the work environment and its demands with different levels of breadth and 
depth. Some of the possibilities are discussed in Sanderson and Grundgeiger (2015) in 
the context of how workplace interruptions in healthcare have been studied, using 
Woods’ (1985) tension among specificity, realism, and meaningfulness. 
 
X.5.2 A staged worlds example in emergency medicine 
 
A recent paper in Annals of Emergency Medicine co-authored by Woods (Smith et al., 
2013) illustrates the use of staged worlds to support a CTA. In the paper the principles 
and methods of CTA are exposed for the benefit of an audience of emergency medical 
and paramedical professionals. It is therefore worth describing this example in greater 
detail.  
 
Smith et al. (2013) presented a cognitive task analysis (CTA) of the performance of 
experienced and less experienced paramedics as they handled simulated emergency 
response scenarios. The purpose of the research was to understand the cognitive 
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strategies used by paramedics—and by the emergency medical system more 
generally—to adapt to novel challenges. 
 
Participating paramedics in the Smith et al. (2013) study handled two emergency 
scenarios. The scenarios were based on actual cases and were developed with the help 
of subject matter experts and reviewed by further experts before being presented to the 
participants. In the first scenario, a middle-aged man presented with chest pain, 
suggesting an initial diagnosis of a heart attack, but the eventual diagnosis was a 
pulmonary embolism (blockage in an artery in the lung) rather than a heart attack. Each 
participant had to detect the cues for the pulmonary embolism and revise their initial 
diagnosis accordingly. In the second scenario, two shooting victims had to be 
monitored and treated simultaneously. One patient had a head wound, was 
unresponsive, and slowly deteriorating, whereas the other patient had a chest wound, 
was responsive, but indications were that he might suddenly deteriorate with a tension 
pneumothorax (introduction of air into the pleural space that impedes return of blood to 
the heart). Each participant had to detect the more immediate risk presented by the 
second patient, and arrange an appropriate delegation of care between himself and a 
less-qualified EMT-basic level partner, given the balance of risks. 
 
The methods that Smith et al. (2013) used to elicit the paramedics’ problem solving 
exemplify the approach to CTA advocated and practiced by Woods and colleagues 
since the early 1980s. First, the paramedics’ cognitive strategies were investigated by 
observing domain practitioners handling professionally authentic situations. Second, 
rather than using open-ended field observation, where complex situations may not 
happened often enough and predictably enough to be analysed efficiently, the 
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researchers used ‘mixed-fidelity simulation’ or ‘staged worlds’ in which carefully 
selected complex situations were partially reconstructed and presented to practitioners. 
In the Smith et al. example, patients were simulated computationally, whereas the 
participant’s EMT-basic level partner was acted by a member of the research team. 
Third, the researchers investigated situations that were complex and that involved 
cognitive challenges for the participants, rather than situations that were routine for the 
participants.  
 
Similarly, the methods that Smith et al. (2013) used to analyse the records of 
paramedics’ problem solving are typical of CTA at its best. Smith et al. sought 
evidence for activities that might distinguish the problem solving processes of the 
experienced vs. less experienced paramedics. They therefore used process tracing, “a 
technique that uses iterative passes through the data to capture domain-specific and 
progressively more abstract patterns of cognitive performance” (p. 372). The 
audiovisual records were transcribed, and analysed in a series of passes that moved 
from constructing a coherent account of the basic activities as they unfolded over time, 
to identifying high level patterns of reasoning and decision making that typify different 
levels of expertise. The analyses involved a process of abstraction similar to that used 
in the human performance model of Hollnagel et al. (1981).. 
 
What the Smith et al. (2013) example does not show is the intimate connection 
between cognitive task analysis and cognitive task design (CTD) that is also a core 
feature of CSE and the work of Woods and his colleagues. As Woods (1998) has 
memorably noted in the title of one of his papers, “designs are hypotheses about how 
artifacts shape cognition and collaboration” (p. 168).  
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In addition, although it presents generalisations about expertise, the Smith et al. 
example has a practical purpose and does not proceed to infer or invoke laws. In more 
recent work, Woods and colleagues have encapsulated regularities in how joint 
cognitive systems work into a series of laws, described below. 
 
X.4  Theoretical Descriptions of Joint Cognitive Systems at Work 
A key question for those analyzing cognitive work is where the more formal or 
theoretical language comes from that is the result of the CTA or the motivation for the 
CTD. Specifically, what is the source of the competence description at the top of 
Figure 2?  
 
In the original Hollnagel et al. (1981) report of the human performance model, the 
question driving the investigation was how best to train human operators to control 
NPPs. Summaries reflecting analyses at different levels of the performance analysis 
diagram supported different kinds of training activity. For example, aggregated 
performance data that preserved details of individual or team cognitive work in 
context—including data representations informed by formal concepts such as switches 
between strategies—supported training in the form of direct operator debriefing. In 
contrast, tools and concepts that Hollnagel et al. used to move from domain-specific to 
domain-independent descriptions included analytic templates such as the “human 
malfunction” taxonomy or the skills-rules-knowledge (SRK) framework, the decision 
ladder, and variants of them adapted to the needs of the research. Summaries using the 
latter tools and concepts supported evaluation of the overall effectiveness of training 
programs, rather than the specification of training content. 
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The specific formal language or theoretical framework that might occupy the 
competence description at the top of Figure 2 will depend of course on the specific 
question that the analyst is investigating. The theoretical framework could have many 
origins and could be based in theories of expertise, learning, diagnosis, stability and 
control, adaptation, or decision making, amongst many others.  
 
Over the years of observing how cognitive work is managed in complex sociotechnical 
systems undergoing change, and the challenges that people face as partners in joint 
cognitive systems, Woods and colleagues have developed “laws” that describe how 
joint cognitive systems function and that account for successes or failures in the 
interaction between people, technology and work (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005; Woods 
& Hollnagel, 2006). Decades of research into the impact of new technologies in 
domains such as power generation, aviation, critical care, and other domains makes it 
abundantly clear that joint cognitive systems are not always designed in a way that 
avoids the pitfalls captured in some of the above laws. Therefore an efficient way to 
investigate the impact of change on cognitive work is to be guided by search for 
instances where these laws have been respected or violated. In other words, the analyst 
should be prepared to find instances where the laws are in operation but also prepared 
to find instances where the relationships described by the laws are present in new, 
surprising, ways, or are absent.  
 
Hollnagel and Woods (2005) and Woods and Hollnagel (2006) called the above 
universals laws that govern joint cognitive systems at work. They are laws in the sense 
of being general truths proposed about how joint cognitive systems function that have 
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been found to hold over a wide variety of domains. As the authors note, however, the 
laws unfortunately appear to be “optional” in terms of whether designers respect them, 
yet the consequences of not respecting them are inevitable. Specifically, evidence 
suggests that if the laws are not respected when new technology is introduced into a 
work system, new complexities are introduced and operators do not have the tools to 
cope with those complexities  
 
Woods and Hollnagel (2006) proposed five general categories of the laws that govern 
joint cognitive systems at work. The Laws of Adaptation cover phenomena associated 
with “how cognitive systems adapt to the potential for surprise in the world of work”. 
The Laws of Models cover phenomena associated with how through models (mental or 
otherwise) based on the past, people project into the future. The Laws of Collaboration 
cover phenomena associated with the fact that cognitive work is distributed over 
multiple agents and artifacts, and so is inherently social and distributed in nature. The 
Laws of Responsibility cover phenomena associated with the fact that people modify 
artifacts to better achieve their own goals.  Finally, Norbert’s Contrast of People and 
Computers (named for Norbert Weiner) expresses the fundamental truth that “artificial 
agents are literal minded and disconnected from the world while human agents are 
context sensitive and have a stake in outcomes” (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006; p. 158).  
 
Each category of the laws that govern joint cognitive systems at work contains several 
more specific laws that are also generalisations about the effective or ineffective 
functioning of joint cognitive systems. There are too many specific laws to detail here, 
and they are described in more detail in Woods and Hollnagel (2006). However, some 
examples of the Laws of Adaptation should provide the flavor of the more specific 
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laws and give an idea of how they might be used “top down” during an analysis of 
cognitive work, either as hypotheses about factors shaping cognitive work (left side of 
Figure 2), or as principles that must be respected when designing new cognitive work 
tasks or tools (right side of Figure 2).  
 
One of the Laws of Adaptation is context-conditioned variability, or “the ability to 
adapt behavior in changing circumstances to pursue goals” (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006; 
p. 171). When studying people’s response to disturbances or changes in their work, an 
analyst’s awareness of this law would focus their attention on changes or constancies 
in the kind of behavioural routines in evidence, constraints being respected, and 
apparent goals being pursued. Experienced operators might be quicker to recognize the 
change in circumstances, and quicker to find new behavioural routines that will 
nonetheless respect constraints and satisfy the original goals. If an analyst is aware of 
the regularity expressed in the concept of context-conditioned variability, then they 
may be quicker to recognize its absence or presence in the behavior of the operators 
being observed.  
 
A further Law of Adaptation is the Law of Stretched Systems, which is the idea that 
“every system is stretched to operate at its capacity … as soon as there is some 
improvement, some new technology, we exploit it to achieve a new intensity and a new 
tempo of activity” (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006; p. 171). Awareness of this law would 
focus the analyst’s attention not just to anticipated uses of a new technology but also to 
the emergence of unanticipated uses of it, potentially directed at goals other than those 
for which the technology was developed, and it would focus the analyst’s attention on 
investigating the consequences of those unanticipated uses more broadly. 
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The benefit of laws of course is that they provide a basis for interpretation, 
generalization and prediction. They are therefore an integral part of CTA and CTD. It 
is clear from the above high-level description that the laws all refer to some aspect of 
joint cognitive systems at work, in a work domain or environment.  
 
 
X.7  Conclusions 
In this chapter I have provided a brief sketch of how cognitive work is conceptualized 
and analysed in the CSE work of Woods and his colleagues. I have also briefly related 
Woods’ approach to other communities of practice and other approaches, such as 
CWA and other forms of CTA, while noting that they all spring from a similar history 
and set of motivations. Despite this, I have only skimmed the surface of the approach 
that Woods and colleagues take to the study of cognitive work.  
 
The performance analysis framework that covers both CTA and CTD is important and 
it deserves to sit at the core of many future investigations of cognitive work and many 
reviews of its methods. At the core of the framework is the role of theory – theory 
development, theory testing, and theory use – and it can be seen how theory that is 
developed in one domain of work or for one set of problems may become a powerful 
tool for the analyst when starting to understand cognitive work in a novel domain, or 
starting to investigate a novel set of problems. The set of generalisations represented in 
Woods’ laws that govern joint cognitive work provide such theoretical leverage. 
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Finally, an understanding of the cognitive systems triad is essential to understanding 
the value of understanding cognitive work through staged worlds, alongside other 
methods. The cognitive systems triad emphasizes that cognitive work in a complex 
domain must be studied in the process of engaging with that domain, rather than 
separately from it. From this follows the importance of naturalistic field studies and, 
particularly, of staged worlds that have been constructed to provide a more efficient 
way of exposing authentic cognitive work.  
 
Readers should refer to Woods and Hollnagel (2006) for an integrated description and 
further development of many of the themes touched on in this chapter. Many of the 
more informative examples and expositions are in book chapters, some of which are 
referenced in this chapter. 
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